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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mitchell Ponting appeals from the district court's final judgment dismissing his postconviction petition.

The district court erred in summarily dismissing two of Mr. Ponting's

claims because it did not first give him notice and an opportunity to respond to its reasons for
dismissal.

Therefore, this Court should vacate the final judgment and the district court's order

granting the State's motion for summary dismissal in part, and remand Mr. Ponting's case to the
district court for further proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Ponting with two counts of possession of a controlled substance
and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2016-1253,
after officers found a syringe of heroin inside a bag in his car. (R., p.44.) He later pled guilty to
one count of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.34-42.) In exchange, the State agreed
to recommend a unified term of four years, with one year fixed, to dismiss the remaining
charges, and not to charge Mr. Ponting with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.34-37.)
The district court later imposed the sentence recommended by the State. (R., pp.44-45.)
Mr. Ponting then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.5-11.) Among
other things, he argued that his trial attorney was ineffective for refusing to test the syringe and
the bag in which the syringe was found for fmgerprints and DNA. (R., pp. 7 (original petition),
57-58 (amended petition).)

He asserted in his amended verified petition that he asked his

attorney to have the bag and syringe tested, but his attorney refused; if the bag and syringe had
been tested, the result would have shown that Mr. Ponting's fingerprints and DNA were not
present but may have shown the fingerprints and DNA of another person; that evidence would be
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exculpatory; and if Mr. Ponting had that exculpatory evidence, he would have chosen to go to
trial rather than plead guilty. (R., pp.57-59.)
The State moved for summary dismissal, arguing that Mr. Ponting failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding (1) deficient performance, because the record
contradicted his claim that he asked his attorney to have the bag and syringe tested but his
attorney refused (see, e.g., R., p.101), and (2) prejudice because, when he pled guilty, the bag
and syringe had not been tested, so the State could not have presented any evidence at trial that
his fingerprints or DNA were on the syringe or the bag (see, e.g., R., p.88).
After a hearing, the court summarily dismissed all but one of Mr. Ponting's claims.
(R., pp.117-31.) As for the claims regarding counsel's refusal to test the bag and syringe, the
district court explained its reason for dismissal as follows:
Defendant made a voluntary unconditional plea, where he indicated he
understood that a guilty plea would waive challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence and that he was admitting the truth of the charge as alleged in the
Information.
Because the heroin was present in his car, and he was aware it was there,
Petitioner has established facts to show a violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(l)
for felony possession of heroin. Thus, whether his fingerprints or DNA were on
the bag or syringe is immaterial.
Based on a review of the record, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to
show he would not have plead guilty had trial counsel tested the evidence and,
therefore, has failed to show prejudice.
(R., pp.127-28.)

The court dismissed the remammg claim after an evidentiary hearing

(R., pp.146-57; see generally 9/7/18 Tr.), and issued a fmal judgment in favor of the State
(Aug., pp.1-2). Mr. Ponting timely appealed. (R., pp.159-61.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing two of Mr. Ponting's claims without giving
him notice and an opportunity to respond to its reasons for dismissing those claims?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Two Of Mr. Ponting's Claims Without
Giving Him Notice And An Opportunity To Respond To Its Reasons For Dismissing Those
Claims
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
"[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)). In Idaho, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally brought in a postconviction petition. See State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1999). A post-conviction
petition initiates a civil action in which the petitioner prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based.

State v. Dunlap,

155 Idaho 345, 361 (2013); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). To succeed on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must generally show that (1) his attorney's
performance did not meet "an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) his attorney's
deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction relief if
"there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw." I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). However,
The district court cannot dismiss claims on its own motion if it does not give the
parties a twenty-day prior notice stating its reason for doing so as required by
Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). Likewise, if the State moves to dismiss a petition
under Idaho Code § 19-4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on a ground not
asserted by the state in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice
required by Section l 9-4906(b ).

DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602 (2009); see also I.C. § 19-4906(b) ("When a court is
satisfied ... that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be
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served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the
application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply
within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. ... "); Mallory v. State, 159 Idaho 715, 721 (Ct. App.
2015) (finding Mallory was not provided notice and an opportunity to respond to the grounds for
dismissing his claim by either the State or the district court as required by LC. § 19-4906).
This Court reviews the district court's decision to summarily dismiss a petition de novo.

Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).
The district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Ponting's claims that his attorney
was ineffective for refusing to test the bag and syringe for fingerprints and DNA because the
State requested dismissal for different reasons than those ultimately adopted by the district court.
As a result, Mr. Ponting was not given notice and an opportunity to respond to the district court's
reasons for dismissal.
The entirety of the State's arguments in favor of summarily dismissing Mr. Ponting's
claims are as follows:
Ponting has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he would not have
pled guilty if the syringe or bag were tested. When Ponting pled guilty, the
syringe and bag had not been tested so the State had no evidence to present at a
trial that his fingerprints or DNA were present on the syringe or the bag. Ponting
knew the State had no evidence his fingerprints or DNA were present on the
syringe or bag before he pled guilty. Test results could not have played any role
in Ponting's decision to plead guilty because the circumstances before any testing
were the same as he believed they would be after it was done.
(R., p.88 (emphasis added).)
Ponting claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to have the syringe of
heroin tested for his fingerprints and DNA and the bag tested for fingerprints. The
State moved for judgment because Ponting failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact he was prejudiced: he failed to show a reasonable probability that he
would not have pled guilty if his attorney had the syringe and bag tested to show
his fingerprints were not there. Counsel responded that the State's assertion that
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"no testing" was the same as "testing to show no fingerprints" was not the same
and counsel's refusal to test prejudiced Ponting.
The State's motion for disposition of the claims was based solely on
whether Ponting was prejudiced by his attorney's actions. The State argued, at
the time Ponting pled guilty, the circumstances were that he knew the bag and
syringe had not been tested. Ponting would therefore have known, the State
would not have been able to present testimony or evidence his fingerprints were
not on the bag or syringe and that his attorney could have argued at a trial his
fingerprints were never found on the syringe or bag. Despite this know ledge that
the State had no evidence his fingerprints were on the bag or syringe, Ponting pled
guilty anyway. Ponting can 't now allege that evidence his fingerprints weren 't on
the bag or syringe would have in anyway impacted his decision because the state
of the evidence when he pled guilty was his fingerprints weren 't on the bag or
syringe.
Counsel's further response was to address whether having the syringe and
bag tested was deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland which
was not analyzed by the State. The State will now address the deficiency prong in
Strickland. Ponting has also failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that his
attorney was deficient. Ponting claims he asked his attorney to have the bag and
syringe tested forensically for DNA and fingerprints. Ponting's claim is
disproven by the record. In his guilty plea form, Ponting was asked:
17. Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do that has not
been done? Ponting indicated "no" under oath.
49. Are you satisfied with your attorney? Ponting indicated "yes" under
oath.
(R., pp.100-01 (citations omitted).)
[T]he analysis is . . . not what a trial attorney would think is different, but it's
what the subjective belief of Mr. Ponting was, and my point is, you can't come
before the court now and say that it would have mattered because there was no
evidence that your fingerprints were on that bag anyway, or the syringe. The state
wasn't going to be able to prove that, you're not alleging that your lawyer told
you that, so you can't show a reasonable probability that, but for that testing being
done, you wouldn't have pled guilty.
The second piece of that is to say, well, if they would have tested it and
shown someone else's fingerprints were on there, I wouldn't have pled guilty, but
you don't have any evidence that other people's fingerprints were on there. He
didn't come to court with admissible evidence, and that's what you're required to
show in post-conviction. It's a really high standard for a reason. It's not equal
footing. There's a strong presumption on behalf of counsel that he acted
appropriately, so from the state's perspective, your starting point is that counsel
was competent, and that it's their responsibility to show admissible evidence that,
in fact, he wasn't.
I didn't even analyze-or that it wouldn't have mattered. I didn't analyze
initially in my first motion the deficiency prong in Strickland, but I went ahead
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and did that because counsel included it in his response. He claimed in his
response, it was deficient performance to not have it analyzed, and my reply on
that was, you failed to raise a genuine issue of fact that the attorney was defiant
[sic] because your client's claim that he asked his lawyer to do this, is disproven
by the record.
And I point out that in the transcript, State's Exhibit No. 1, and then under
oath, he says-there's a question-"Is there anything you requested your attorney
to do that hasn't been done?" He says, "No." That's under oath. That's the
record. Then when you're inquiring of him, you ask, "Are you satisfied with your
attorney?" And, he says, "Yes," on page 8.
So even moving forward at an evidentiary hearing, they can't even show
that he asked his attorney. I mean, that's the state of the record. That's what
they're stuck with at this point, so from the state's perspective, we would ask that
the court grant the motion and issue a written opinion.
(3/28/18 Tr., p.17, L.2-p.19, L.2.) Those were not, however, the reasons the district court gave
when it ultimately dismissed Mr. Ponting's claims. The district court explained:
In the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, Petitioner answered pertinent questions as
follows:
16. Have you told your attorney everything you know about the crime?
YES NO
17. Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do that has not
been done? YES NO
18. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor relating to
your case .... This is called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence
provided to your attorney during discovery? YES NO
20. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive any defenses,
both factual and legal, that you believe you may have in this case? YES
NO
21. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that you believe
should be filed in this case? YES NO
22. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional guilty plea in
this case you will not be able to challenge any rulings that came before the
guilty plea.... YES NO
23. Do you understand when you plead guilty, you are admitting the truth
of each and every allegation contained in the charge( s) to which you plead
guilty? YES NO
Thus, Defendant made a voluntary unconditional plea, where he indicated he
understood that a guilty plea would waive challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence and that he was admitting the truth of the charge as alleged in the
Information.
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Additionally, during the guilty plea, Petitioner did not allege that he was
unaware that heroin was in his car:
THE COURT: How is it that you think you committed [the] crime?
THE DEFENDANT: It was in my car.
THE COURT: Okay, by "it," do you mean heroin?
THE DEFENDANT: The heroin was in my car; yes ....
THE COURT: And did you know it was in your car?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ma'am.
THE COURT: And did you know it was heroin?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
Because the heroin was present in his car, and he was aware it was there,
Petitioner has established facts to show a violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(l)
for felony possession of heroin. Thus, whether his fingerprints or DNA were on
the bag or syringe is immaterial.
Based on a review of the record, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to
show he would not have plead [sic] guilty had trial counsel tested the evidence
and, therefore, has failed to show prejudice. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the
State's Motion and summarily dismisses Petitioner's Second and Third Causes of
Action.
(R., pp.127-28.)
In short, the State argued and the district court found that Mr. Ponting had failed to show
prejudice for different reasons.

The State argued that Mr. Ponting failed to prove prejudice

because the state of the evidence was the same when Mr. Ponting pled guilty as it would have
been if the items were tested-there was no evidence that Mr. Ponting's fingerprints and DNA
were on the bag and syringe. (R., pp.88, 100-01; 3/28/18 Tr., p.17, L.2-p.19, L.2.) The court,
on the other hand, dismissed the claims because, as Mr. Ponting admitted at his change of plea
hearing, "the heroin was present in his car, and he was aware it was there" and so "whether his
fingerprints and DNA were on the bag or syringe is immaterial." (R., pp.127-28.) Because
Mr. Ponting did not have notice and an opportunity to respond to the court's stated reasons for
dismissal, the district court erred by dismissing his claims regarding his attorney's refusal to test
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the bag and syringe for fmgerprints and DNA. See I.C. § 19-4906(b); DeRushe, 146 Idaho at
602; Mallory, 159 Idaho at 721.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ponting respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court's order granting
in part the State's motion for summary dismissal and remand his case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYAP. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24 th day of June, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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